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Security assistance is a key element in the formulation of foreign policy in the 
United States. The Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies 
are involved in planning and managing the programs. This paper aims at evaluating 
security assistance programs in the United States and the mechanisms the government 
can use to leverage the programs and build upon the existing capabilities. Consequently, 
this paper examines the roles of the agencies and departments involved in the programs to 
offer an understanding of the limitations and challenges experienced in the execution of 
the programs. While acknowledging the expanding role of the programs, the findings 
indicate a need for reforms in the export-control mechanisms since they have a direct 
effect on security assistance. Additionally, the findings highlight redundancies in the 
execution of the programs because of the involvement of many agencies and 
departments, which have duplicated roles. The study recommends a governance 
framework in the management of the programs since the framework could help in the 
integration of the redundant roles. 
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For almost 50 years, security assistance has been an essential element of United 
States “foreign policy toolkit” (Adams and William 2011, 6). It includes programs for 
economic support, humanitarian and relief support, development assistance, health 
assistance, and military assistance, and several other programs. From the nascent years of 
programs for military assistance, the Department of State through Function 150 of the 
International Affairs Budget has planned, guided, and conducted security assistance. 
Function 150 is the international affairs account that includes cash allocated to aid 
developing nations, as well as military assistance to U.S. allies. However, the Department 
of Defense (DOD) has always handled the implementation of the programs through the 
Defense Security Corporation Agency (and its predecessor agencies). The DOD has a 
direct role in planning and budgeting for the programs. Associated largely with the 
experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the long-established cadre of security assistance 
programs has been combined with several new programs under the oversight, guidance, 
and budget of the DOD (Adams and Williams 2011, 7). The new programs have 
expanded the responsibilities of the Pentagon in security assistance. However, the new 
programs have also raised questions concerning the relationship of the Pentagon to the 
programs, the responsibilities, as well as the authority of the Secretary of State (Adams 
and Williams 2011, 3). 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROJECT 
As the United States makes transitions from its military intervention in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, maintaining global security and stability has become a shared responsibility 
amongst several agencies in the country. Close association with partners and allies in 
addressing common challenges in security has been a crucial part of U.S. foreign policy 
for years. However, the increased interconnectedness of economies around the world 
means that the U.S. national security could be affected by the events in other regions, 
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places, and countries. Consequently, this has led to increased demands for the expansion 
of partnership and deepening of common actions. 
This evaluates U.S. security assistance programs. The paper suggests that the 
reforms in export control for defense or military equipment will help in leveraging 
Security Assistance programs and building upon the existing capabilities. The 
conventional portfolio of security assistance was developed during the Cold War in a 
security perspective, which focused on the security of the recipient nations and the 
adjacent regions. However, the United States has redesigned the old programs to support 
U.S. strategic partnership goals, strengthen military capabilities of the recipient nations, 
and build military-to-military relationships. Since the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the security goals have broadened to encompass building the military capability of local 
security forces and coalition partners. According to Adams and Williams (2011, 7), the 
focus has facilitated the building of reliable partnerships for counter-insurgency 
operations. Additionally, the programs have allowed the United States to avoid 
deployment of U.S. military personnel since the recipient nations can conduct military 
operations on their own. The two goals highlighted by Adams and Williams (2011, 7) 
have a close relationship with the U.S. military operations. The Defense Department has 
had a noteworthy role in budgeting and planning for security assistance programs in 
recent time (Adams and Williams 2011, 6). The DOD justifies its continued push for 
planning and budgeting for the programs by suggesting that it can manage the programs 
with additional agility and flexibility, as well as generate more funding that the 
Department of State (Adams and Williams 2011, 7).  
Even if the United States does not send ground troops to another war, it will 
remain involved in helping its friends and allies around the world. There is little reason to 
think that security assistance will not remain vital in the conflicts to come. As such, it is 
essential to assess these programs today and rethink the framework surrounding them 
(Adams and Williams 2011, p 7). 
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Consequently, this paper follows an approach outlined by Adams and Williams, 
which suggests the re-evaluation of the programs using the concept of governance as the 
framework:  
Governance refers to the broader need to strengthen state capacity in 
failing, fragile, collapsing, and post-conflict states  . . . [and] is linked, in 
turn, to issues of social and economic development, which contribute to 
both stability and long-term growth. A narrow focus on security in U.S. 
security assistance programs misses this vital connection. It de-links 
support for security forces from the need for effective, efficient, and 
accountable governance. Historically, military and other security forces 
empowered through security assistance programs in countries with weak 
governance have too often led to diminished accountability, authoritarian 
government, military coups, and human rights violations. (7)  
Similarly, McNerney, Moroney, Mandaville, and Hagen (2014) asserts that lack 
of government integration has led to a transaction-based approach in security assistance. 
The absence of an integrated approach across stakeholders produces unintended 
outcomes such as the following: 
• Disconnects in planning in which different agencies execute similar 
programs 
• Assistance efforts that do not meet the needs of the recipient nation 
• Insufficient understanding of the effectiveness and performance of the 
programs 
Generating efficient, effective, and accountable security assistance programs that 
avoid focusing on narrow military objectives and concentrate instead on the political end 
state can help transform a country’s chaos to order. Restructuring the security assistance 
program from a military to a governance perspective is therefore an imperative for 
policymakers, soldiers, and diplomats alike (Adams and Williams 2011, 8). 
C. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
This paper examines the roles of various agencies involved in the United States 
security assistance program. The agencies include the Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Department of State, the Department of 
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Defense, and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. The 
project conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the internal and external aspects of 
security assistance for the identification of the redundancies in the security assistance 
programs. Subsequently, it will highlight the changes that the departments should 
institutionalize in security assistance for the improvement of overall security. To this end, 
the report aims at fulfilling the following objectives. 
The primary objective of the research is the examination of the variables that 
affect the conduction of security assistance and the changes that the involved departments 
should institutionalize to improve the system. The secondary objective is to evaluate the 
strategies that the United States can use in leveraging security assistance to increase 
accountability in governance and build stable military capabilities at the same time. The 
following set of sub-objectives will guide the achievement of the above-mentioned 
objectives. 
• To identify the legislation that should be updated 
• To identify and delineate the categories of security assistance (Foreign 
Military Sales, Direct Commercial Sales, and International Military 
Education and Training) 
• To identify the agencies involved with security assistance 
• To assess the current reforms to export controls 
• To analyze the global perspective of security assistance 
• To assess how foreign military sales impact U.S. ability to increase its 
capability 
The project will achieve the objectives through a literature-based methodology, 
which will entail the analysis of the roles of the departments based on secondary data 
from published reports and documentation. 
D. PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this project is organized as follows: Chapter II provides the 
readers with a basic understanding of the concepts, organizations, and systems associated 
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with security assistance in the United States. The chapter analyzes the agencies 
responsible for security assistance (BIS, Department of State, and Office of Foreign 
Assets Control) and regulations on security assistance. Chapter III presents data on the 
existing security assistance limits, the global perspective on security assistance, reforms 
of export controls, redundancies in security assistance, and the future of security 
assistance. Chapter IV discusses the consequences of the findings while the last chapter 
offers conclusions and recommendations. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper identifies and evaluates the existing policies and practices relating to 
arms transfers and security assistance with the goal of formulating recommendations to 
improve future performance. It approaches this task by examining the existing literature 
on the subject through the lens of identifying past problems and developing lessons for 
avoiding those pitfalls in the future. There currently exists a limited number of published 
books about security assistance, and so this paper relies primarily on government 
documents and shorter academic studies that are available on websites. Ensuring that the 
full scope of these studies was considered while quickly and efficiently moving on from 
less relevant or credible work was the major research challenge. The search term 
“security assistance” quickly located a plethora of raw material; brief examination of 
introductions and executive summaries helped to establish a more manageable and 
relevant research base. The analysis in this paper is thematic as described by Braun and 
Clarke (2006, 81). It involves the identification, examination, and recording of themes or 
patterns by means of qualitative description of events and phenomenon (Braun and 
Clarke 2006, 81). Following the collection of information from the selected studies, 
themes were identified that would help in answering the research questions. 
B. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND EXPORT CONTROL 
1. Security Assistance 
According to Adams and Williams (2011, 12), the United States has provided 
approximately $200 billion for security assistance to foreign countries for almost half a 
century:  
Under the statutory authorities of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 
1961 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1972, the United States 
has provided support in the form of grants and loans for the purchase of 
U.S. defense equipment, services, and training; supported the education 
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and training of foreign military officers in the United States; and funded 
training, equipment, and services for foreign military forces participating 
in peacekeeping operations. (12) 
Although the Department of State was traditionally the lead agency in managing 
and overseeing security assistance programs, the Department of Defense began to accrue 
more authority over the years in managing and implementing those programs. In 
Afghanistan and Iraq, for instance, the State Department had fewer resources than DOD 
and could not usually provide the skilled personnel necessary to perform their tasks to 
complement military operations. Sometimes, soldiers did those jobs. Military officers 
have also long cultivated interaction with foreign military establishments to strengthen 
those armies’ capabilities. As a result of these interactions, combined exercises and 
training missions facilitate interoperability and build trust. The focus of these mil-to-mil 
programs was often as much diplomatic as military and the descriptions of military 
engagements could sometimes sound as if they were written by an assistant secretary of 
state. While DOD continued to collaborate with the State Department, the bonds of State 
Department control were loosened, and DOD clearly was in charge (Adams and Williams 
2011, 7–11)  
2. Export Controls 
A variety of fuzzy and contradictory policies have plagued the export control 
system as Ferguson and Kerr (2014, 1) have made clear: “Exporters, nonproliferation 
advocates, allies, and other stakeholders” they write, have argued that controls are “too 
rigorous, insufficiently rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete, inefficient, or any combination. 
Some contend that U.S. export controls overly restrict U.S. exports and make firms less 
competitive. Others argue that U.S. defense and foreign policy considerations should 
trump commercial concerns.” The authors cite a January 2007 Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report that “designated government programs designed to 
protect critical technologies, including the U.S. export control system” at “high risk” and 
warranting “a strategic reexamination of existing programs to identify needed changes.” 
(Ferguson and Kerr 2014, 1). Among the needed changes, a 2012 GAO report argued that 
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reform could be achieved through retaining the interagency structure but centralizing 
licensing control into a single agency and converting to a single IT system. 
There is no doubt that the United States has paid a heavy toll in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in terms of lives lost, soldiers injured, and dollars spent. Despite the heavy 
investment of American blood and money, the benefits that have accrued from these 
operations have not been decisive, but by any measure been scant and uncertain. Some 
argue that it is time for the United States to withdraw from these types of insurgency 
operations forever. Yet it seems clear that even if the United States does not send its own 
soldiers to fight others’ wars, our allies will continue to look to the United States for both 
moral and materiel support and, as Shapiro (2012) argues, strong security assistance 
programs will remain vital to U.S. security. Shapiro quotes former Secretary of Defense 
Panetta’s assessment:  
The United States must place even greater strategic emphasis on building 
the security capabilities of others, and adopting a more collaborative 
approach to security both within the United States government and among 
allies, partners, and multilateral organizations. (24) 
Shapiro summarizes the implications and potential problems of the Unites States’ 
effort to adjust the locus of military operations by stating: 
When the U.S. government is looking for cost-effective ways to achieve 
its strategic objectives at home and around the world, security assistance 
with allies and partners is an increasingly important national security 
priority. However, the ability of the United States to provide security 
assistance may come under strain; the State Department’s budget is often a 
target for cuts in fiscally difficult times, and an underestimation of the 
strategic importance of these programs could limit the ability of the United 
States to partner in the years ahead. (24) 
3. Current Status of Security Assistance 
Currently, the legislative and executive branches of government fund and review 
all security assistance programs. The U.S. government has engaged in almost two years 
of interagency review of the programs under the Obama administration. The Department 
of Defense implemented a 2009 proposal aimed at the formation of joint funding pools 
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between the Department of Defense and the Department of State. The two departments 
aimed at creating a joint pool of funding for security assistance, post-conflict 
reconstruction, and conflict resolution/prevention. The departments engaged in 
negotiations that led to the proposal for the authorization of a Global Security 
Contingency Fund managed by the Department of State. The fund included 
approximately $500 million, of which $50 million was appropriated to the Department of 
State (Adams and Williams 2011, 26). 
The purpose of the fund is expected to be broad in increasing the flexibility of the 
programs. The fund also aims at promoting stabilization efforts, the rule of law, and 
justice in the recipient countries. Essentially, the fund does not aim at eliminating, 
consolidating, or reducing the traditional funding. However, the enactment of the 
proposal has experienced significant debate leading to confusion about coordination and 
the strategic focus of security assistance. Although the Congress has not offered clear 
directions regarding security assistance, it continues supporting and funding the programs 
through the DOD and DoS (Adams and Williams 2011, 26). 
4. Categories of Security Assistance 
Security assistance includes a broad portfolio of programs. However, the main 
programs include the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and 
International Military Education and Training (IMET). In simple terms, security 
assistance entails the transfer of defense or military articles and services from the United 
States to allies and partners, as well as international organizations. 
Official pacts between the U.S. government and its sanctioned countries provide 
the basis for the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Additionally, these purchases are 
sanctioned by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (Serafino 2008, 13). This allows 
countries to purchase defense services, and articles from the United States (Serafino 
2008, 53). The program operates on a “no-loss” and “no-profit” basis to the government. 
Consequently, countries require a letter of request (LOR) before the U.S. government 
considers any transaction (Serafino 2008, 17). 
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Under Foreign Military Sales, the U.S. government writes a letter of offer and 
acceptance (LOA) (a form of government-to-government agreement), which the recipient 
country receives. The LOA specifies the articles and services that the U.S. government 
will provide and the estimated cost. The government may supply the articles from its 
stock or contract them on behalf of the recipient country. The FMS agreements between 
the United States and the recipient countries may undergo frequent changes through 
amendments and modifications. The FMS also allows countries to receive DOD logistics 
and training (Serafino 2008, 19). The FMS is among the multiplicity of programs that 
advance U.S. Foreign Policy, as well as national security objectives. 
Several criteria determine the eligibility of purchasers in using the FMS program. 
First, it must be established that the furnishing of the defense services or articles to the 
purchaser strengthens U.S. national security and promotes world peace. Second, the 
purchaser should have agreed not to transfer the title or the articles and their related 
training to anyone. Additionally, the purchaser should agree not to use the articles or 
services for any other reason other than the ones designated. Third, the purchaser should 
have agreed to maintain the security of the articles or services, and last, the United States 
should confirm that the purchaser is eligible to buy or lease the articles in accordance 
with the U.S. laws governing the sale of military equipment (Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management 2007, 2–3).  
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) are the sales made by U.S. companies to 
international customers without going through the DOD. U.S. industries must obtain a 
license for the sales from the Office of Defense Trade Control in the Department of State. 
Therefore, Direct Commercial Sales are monitored under the ITAR by the Department of 
State. Under the DCS, international customers make contract negotiations with U.S. 
suppliers or manufacturers directly. However, the DCS is applicable when the military 
requirements of the purchaser differ appreciably from the U.S. configurations. 
Additionally, DCS is appropriate when the licensed production between domestic 
industry and the U.S. manufacturers (Walter 2001, 2). 
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The International Military Education and Training program was designed for 
training and helping military forces in ally and partner countries. The Department of 
State has maintained a consistent oversight over the program. Under the program, 
military personnel from the recipient countries travel to the United States to experience 
U.S. military practices first-hand. According to Shapiro (2012, 28), the program has 
become a tool for the professionalization of militaries in the partner countries through 
imparting the fundamental U.S. values such as civilian control and human rights of the 
military. Additionally, the program has assisted in the creation of personal relationships 
between the United States and the partner countries. Although the Department of State 
controls the program, the Congress advances funds and authorizes the programs through 
the DOD. 
5. Challenges Facing the U.S. Security Assistance Programs 
Adams and Williams (2011, 20) state that security assistance programs must 
overcome several obstacles in order to improve and reintroduce capabilities. The 
challenges include the lack of strategic guidance, a disparity of the agencies and 
departments’ capabilities, the need for agility and flexibility, and a disparity of funding 
for the agencies. 
The lack of strategic guidance: Essentially, many agencies involved in security 
assistance operate with little reference to the related agencies. The Department of State 
and the Department of Defense have different views of security assistance, although they 
remain the main agencies involved in the programs. The end of the Cold War reinforced 
the lack of a coherent structure and design. Typically, the Department of State maintained 
the portfolio of programs that reinforce strategic relationships with allies and partners. 
Conversely, the Department of Defense focused on the operational requirements of the 
U.S. military and its assistance to allies and partners (Adams and Williams 2011, 20). 
Consequently, the two departments lacked a unifying theme and objective in their roles in 
security assistance. Additionally, there has been an insufficient evaluation of the 
performance of the programs over the rule different administrations. Each administration 
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inherits a portfolio of programs and authorities but does not conduct a thorough review of 
the accomplished goals in relation to foreign policy objective (Adams and Williams 
2011, 20). Therefore, Adams and Williams (2011, 20) suggest that the United States can 
restore the rationality of the programs through reviewing the programs and designing a 
coherent strategy. 
A disparity of capacities: The agencies involved have differing capacities 
because of under- investment. According to Adams and Williams (2011, 22), the capacity 
of the Department of State in the development, budgeting, and supervision of the 
implementation of the programs has consistently declined over the years. The State has 
focused only on a limited number of strategic countries including Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, 
and Jordan as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1.  Foreign Military Financing Under Security Assistance (FY2010) 
 
Source: Adams, Gordon. and Rebecca Williams. 2011. A New Way Forward: 
Rebalancing Security Assistance Programs and Authorities. Washington, DC: Henry L. 
Stimson Center.  
Conversely, the Department of Defense has increased its efforts in security 
assistance based on its knowledge of planning for such activities. Nonetheless, the DOD 
has also suffered setbacks because of the bureaucracy governing security assistance 
(Adams and Williams 2011, 22). 
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Need for agility and flexibility: The agencies involved in security assistance 
portray disparity in terms of agility and flexibility (Adams and Williams 2011, 20). The 
DOD argued that the existing programs and authorities for were slow and inflexible in 
responding to the changing security threats (Serafino 2014, 26). The assertion echoes the 
sentiments by Gates (2010, 4) that the approaches used in security assistance should 
reflect flexibility and agility. The Arms Control and Export Act and the Foreign 
Assistance Act do not reflect the current needs since they were designed during the Cold 
War (Adams and Williams 2011, 20). The inflexibility of the programs during the Cold 
War aimed at controlling the sale of military items to non-allies to prevent violations of 
human rights (Adams and Williams 2011, 21). Additionally, the United States used the 
regulations to build the military capacity of its allies to resist Soviet-sponsored 
insurgencies without direct military intervention (Gates 2010, 2). The requirements under 
the regulations create additional notification requirements, oversight, and earmarking, 
which slow the flexibility and agility of the programs (Adams and Williams 2011, 21). 
Although amendments have led to some flexibility, the lack of overall attention from the 
administration has led to laxity from the Department of State in using the flexibilities. 
A disparity in funding: Security Assistance suffers from setbacks created by the 
disparity of funding. The Department of State has the statutory mandate on security 
assistance (Serafino 2010, 26), but the majority of the funds for the programs are offered 
from the DOD budgetary allocations. Between 2010 and 2011, the funding from the 
Department of State fell by approximately 42% while funding from the Department of 
Defense rose by 58% (Adams and Williams 2011, 23). Congress has portrayed significant 
willingness in funding the DOD because of its role in counterterrorism. Figure 2 




Figure 2.  Share of U.S. Security Assistance Programs  
 
Source: Adams, Gordon, and Rebecca Williams. 2011. A New Way Forward: 
Rebalancing Security Assistance Programs and Authorities. Washington, DC: Henry L. 
Stimson Center.   
Essentially, the Congress has offered much of the funding through supplemental 
appropriations. Although State-USAID funding increased by up to 66% between 2003 
and 2011, most of the funds were used in building strategic partnerships, especially in the 
Middle East. Congress has shown reluctance in funding the Department of State for its 
roles in security assistance. Most of the accounts in the Department of State focus on 
refugee and humanitarian needs rather than security assistance. 
C. AGENCIES INVOLVED IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND EXPORT 
CONTROL 
A large number of agencies are involved in security assistance and export control 
in the United States. The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
(BIS) is accountable for the implementation and enforcement of Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR) (Wiggenhorn, Gleason, and Sukhwani 2014, 103). The regulations 
“pertain to the export and re-export of dual-use commercial items” (Kozyulin 2009). The 
Department of State has the technical responsibility for approving explicit military sales. 
The DoS enforces the International Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Arms Export 
Control Act regulates purchases (Ordway, 2009). The Office of Foreign Assets Control 
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imposes economic and trade sanctions with specific legislation and executive powers 
within the Department of the Treasury (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2015). 
1. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security  
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) enforces 
import and export “restrictions for reasons of national security, foreign policy, and 
nonproliferation” (Wiggenhorn 2014, 103). While the Department of State controls the 
export of military items, the authority of BIS is to control export of dual-use items. 
Consequently, the agency can deny domestic of foreign persons or companies export 
privileges under the auspices of the EAR. Additionally, the BIS may deny the privileges 
as sanctions in case the entity has a criminal conviction associated with statutes such as 
the Arms Export Control Act (Ferguson and Paul 2014, 3). The BIS can also impose 
temporary denial order (TDO) for the prevention of immediate violation of the EAR 
(Hirschhorn 2010, 128). The BIS often publishes the names of the entities that have been 
denied export privileges in the Federal Register. The purpose of export controls is to 
facilitate foreign policy and national security interests of the United States, as well as 
conduct its international obligations. The BIS has the challenge of enabling legitimate 
global trade in U.S. technology and goods while maintaining the items and technologies 
from proliferating to terrorists. The BIS controls the export of items that may have 
multiple commercial and military applications, which is governed by the Export 
Administration Regulations (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010). The items could be 
commodities, technology, or software such as building materials, clothing, automotive 
parts, circuit boards, off-the-shelf software, blueprints, and technical information. 
However, Wiggenhorn (2014, 101) suggests that some of the provisions of the EAR 
focus on individuals rather than entire countries. 
The scope of control of the BIS includes items in the United States, specific items 
outside the United States, activities of U.S. citizens and deemed exports. The items and 
activities include all items of U.S. origin, foreign items containing items originating from 
the United States, foreign items of technology and software originating from the United 
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States, and activities of U.S. citizens including those that support the proliferation of 
related activities (Bureau of Industry Security 2009, 62). Essentially, the core duty of the 
Bureau of Industry and Security (2009) is to advance the country’s foreign policy, 
economic and national security goals by guaranteeing an operative export control, treaty 
compliance systems, as well as the promotion of continued strategic technology in the 
United States. 
The mission of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is to advance 
U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives by 
ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and by 
promoting continued U.S. strategic technology leadership. (62) 
In its mandate, the Bureau of Industry and Security has to define the export 
license requirements. First, the BIS identifies the classification of the item. All items have 
an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN). The BIS lists items, according to their 
technical parameters. Essentially, the ECCN identifies the major “Reasons For Control” 
as national security (NS), anti-terrorism (AT), chemical and biological (CB) reasons, 
missile technology (MT) reasons and nuclear nonproliferation (NP) among other reasons. 
Other considerations in export control by the BIS include the destination, end-user, and 
end-use of the item. The Commerce Control List (CCL) has the items subject BIS 
licensing authority. Items not included in the CCL fall under the EAR99 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 2010, 5). However, some items have license exceptions. A 
license exception from BIS authorizes exports in case the transaction satisfies certain 
criteria that would otherwise require licensing based on the Reason for Control (U.S. 
Department of Commerce 2010, 5). In many cases, the exporter does not require written 
authorization from the BIS. In summary, BIS regulates the export and re-export of the 
items that could jeopardize national and global security. 
2. The Department of State 
Technically, the Department of State has the responsibility of approving all 
military sales (U.S. Department of Commerce 2010, 1). Macuso (2014, 1) explains that 
the Arms Export Control Act dictates how sales are made; these rules are further enforced 
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by the Department of State though the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 
The department enforces the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) sales 
governed by the Arms Export Control Act (Macuso 2014, 1). The department represents 
the United States in approximately 180 countries and 43 international organizations with 
260 operational embassies. The State Department formulates and implements the 
country’s foreign policy with the priority being the fight against terrorism since 
September 11, 2001. The Department of State approves all sales of defense services and 
articles to foreign countries pursuant of Section 2 of the AECA. The Department of State 
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) collaborates with the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in controlling such sales. Unlike the 
BIS, the Department of State controls the export, transfer, and re-export of defense 
services and articles to non-U.S. destinations and non-U.S. persons pursuant of the ITAR. 
Additionally, the department can impose restrictions on transactions conducted by non-
U.S. parties. These transactions involve the retransfer of defense articles of U.S. origin 
from a non-U.S. entity to another (Gilman 2014, 35). 
The State Department has a central role in security assistance and control of 
military sales because the programs have significant implications for foreign policy 
(Shapiro 2012, 27). The department not only promotes Foreign Military Assistance under 
the security assistance programs but also provides weapons platforms such as training 
and spare parts for the operation and maintenance of the weaponry (Shapiro 2012, 28).  
The State Department has largely acquiesced in this expansion of DOD 
funding, authority and responsibility without redefining its role or overall 
mission of security assistance. State remains responsible for Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and 
Training. (Adams and Williams 2011, 12) 
However, the department requires complex interagency cooperation and inputs in 
running the programs (Shapiro 2012, 33), which has led to experts citing inefficiency in 
the programs (Adams and Williams 2011, 19). 
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3. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Department of Treasury 
has several responsibilities related to the national and global peace and security. 
Fundamentally, the OFAC conducts the administration and enforcement of trade and 
economic sanctions for individual or countries that engage in criminal activity outlined 
by the U.S. national security objectives (Bridger Systems 4; Peccei 2002; U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 2015, 1). The OFAC functions under the authority granted by 
specific legislation and presidential national emergency powers. 
According to the Department of the Treasury’s website, OFAC “administers and 
enforces economic sanctions programs primarily against countries and groups of 
individuals, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers.” Currently, almost 30 countries 
are identified as having either “comprehensive or selective” sanctions that serve to “block 
assets” and impose “trade restrictions” in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and 
national security. The Treasury says that OFAC integrates its data with the other agencies 
to facilitate effective screening and maintenance of compliance (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury 2015, 1). 
4. Defense Logistics Agency 
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) offers a centralized mechanism for the 
disposal and management of surplus and excess military property (Grasso 2014, 1). The 
main component of the agency entails the reutilization of the surplus and excess defense 
articles (EDA) to prevent wasteful purchases in the Department of Defense. The Defense 
Logistics Agency implements the DOD’s controls for the prevention of unauthorized 
transfer of surplus and excess military and defense articles (Leon et al. 2013, 1). The 
DLA plays the role in conjunction with several DOD components including the Defense 
Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS─a part of the DLA) and the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The DLA ensures that all the shipment of defense 
articles under the Foreign Military Sales program follows the applicable rules and 
procedures (Reynolds 2010, 3–6). 
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Essentially, the DLA acts as the agency in charge of DOD’s combat logistics 
support (Grasso 2014, 1). The agency’s mission is to offer the best value for America’s 
Armed Forces and the eligible customers. The broad activities of the DLA include the 
storage, distribution, and facilitation of the disposal and reutilization of defense articles, 
as well as the management of the DOD’s stockpile and provision of logistics information 
to the DOD (DLA 2009, 2). The DLA Disposition Services facilitates the disposal of the 
EDA (Grasso 2014, 4). Excess Defense Articles include all defense items the DOD does 
not need any more as declared by the U.S. Armed Forces. However, the articles may 
require demilitarization when the foreign countries no longer need them to avoid their 
transfer to non-friendly countries. The DLA oversees the demilitarization process 
(Inspector General 2009, 5). DLA’s DRMS managers compile lists from excess 
equipment reports submitted by the Services to determine the availability of U.S. excess 
equipment available to foreign governments and then establish case files when eligible 
foreign governments submit requests for the EDA. The acquisition of the excess defense 
articles from the DLA requires the case managers from DRMS to send Letter of Offer 
and Acceptance to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for review, endorsement, 
and signature (Inspector General 2009, 6). 
5. USASAC, NIPO, and SAF/IA 
The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) has a strategic role in 
managing the Army’s Security programs. Additionally, the USASAC leads the AMC 
Security Assistance Enterprise (ASAE), as well as cases associated with Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) (Turner 2012, 5). The strategic role extends beyond the initial planning 
phase to the development of the requirements that ensure its activities remain on course. 
Fundamentally, the USASAC acts as the point of contact between the Army and the 
Department of Defense, foreign governments, as well as other government offices and 
agencies. The USASAC derives its policy guidance from the Defense Security Assistance 
Agency jointly managed by the Department of Defense and the Department of State. 
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The roles of the USASAC relates to several other agencies involved in the 
management and control of the sale of defense articles. First, the USASAC acts as the 
Implementing Agency for Security Assistance programs meaning that it receives the 
Letters of Request from the eligible governments. Additionally, the agency provides 
materials and related services to the eligible countries. The USASAC also coordinates 
with different Army commands, military depots, as well as government agencies and 
private organizations for the support of the approved programs. The core role entails the 
provision of the labor force and financial data necessary for the FMS Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM). Additionally, the USASAC offers administrative support for the 
development and handling of cases associated with FMS (Turner 2012, 5).  
While USASAC manages Army’s security assistance programs, the Navy 
International Programs office manages all the Navy’s SA programs (Reynolds 2010, 3–
16). All the management of the Navy’s SA programs is conducted at Naval Education 
and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA). Conversely, Secretary of 
the Air Force, Deputy Undersecretary for International Affairs (SAF/IA) oversees, 
develops, and implements the USAF/IA activities (Reynolds 2010, 3–18). According to 
Reynolds (2010, 3–19), the success of U.S. security assistance program requires 
cooperation from all agencies within the government. Although the Secretary of State has 
the role of supervising the programs, the DOD has the largest supportive role that tends to 
override the authority of the Secretary of State. 
D. REGULATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
Several regulations govern Export Control Systems and Security Assistance in the 
United States. Some of the regulations include the Export Administration Act, 
International Traffic in Arms Regulation, U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976. 
1. Export Administration Act  
The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979 is the statutory authority that 
controls how dual-use items can and cannot be exported to the United States. Despite its 
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expiry, the EAA has been authorized periodically for short periods, depending on the 
needs (Ferguson and Kerr 2014, 2). Currently, export licensing under EAA continues 
through a Presidential Declaration. This executive authority is outlined in the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which gives the president 
power to establish requirements for the Commerce Control List (CCL) (Ferguson and 
Kerr 2014, 3). 
The intent of the EAA was to improve strategic relationships, the existent 
commercial technologies, and international business practices of the time. (Ferguson and 
Kerr 2014, 3). However, many of the elements have changed over time. Consequently, 
some experts and members of Congress demand the liberalization of the export 
regulation to allow U.S. companies in engaging in effective international competition for 
the sale of the controlled goods (Ferguson and Kerr 2014, 3). In spite of this, many 
political leaders and dignitaries contend that current regulations should be changed due to 
the present and potential threats to the nation’s security.  
The Bureau of Industry and Security manages the dual-purpose exports under the 
EAA. The BIS took the responsibility after the detachment of the licensing and 
enforcement responsibilities from the International Trade Administration (ITA) in 1985. 
The enforcement of the EAA has become a core mission for the BIS henceforth. The 
implementation of the EAA occurs through the auspices of the Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR), which, in turn, has continued its functionality under the IEEPA 
authority after the expiry of the EAA. The EAR sets the licensing policies for 
commodities and destinations, the process of application by exporters, and the CCL. 
Currently, the penalties related to the violation of export regulations rely on the IEEPA 
since the expiration of the EAA (Ferguson and Kerr 2014, 2). 
2. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
The Directorate of The Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), in coordination with the 
Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), manages the enforcement of the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). As a result, the ITAR controls the 
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technical data and materiel that can be used for military applications. (Ordway 1). 
According to Ferguson and Paul (2014, 6), the ITAR governs the regulation of the U.S. 
Munitions List (USML). The Department of State has assigned the term “defense 
articles” or “services” to the controlled items. The regulation furthers the country’s 
security objectives while supporting valid requirements for efficient and mutually 
favorable defense relationships (Ordway 2009, 1). 
The ITAR designates items as defense articles in case the manufacturer designed, 
configured, developed, modified, or adapted them for military use. The intention for use 
after its export does not determine whether an item falls in the USML. The DDTC 
determines whether items are defense articles. The agency has significant discretion in 
making the deliberations. The DDTC issues temporary or permanent licenses for the 
export of such items. There exists a limited number of exemptions for export, as well as 
temporary imports of defense articles and services other than the ones provided in section 
126.6. ITAR applies to FMS but does not apply to DCS. Figure 3 represents the licensing 
process under the ITAR. 
Figure 3.  Licensing Process under the ITAR 
 
Source: United States Department of Commerce and Federal Aviation Administration. 
2008. “Introduction to U.S. Export Controls for the Commercial Space Industry.” 
Washington, DC: FAA and DOC https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters 
_offices/ast/media/Intro%20to%20US%20Export%20Controls.pdf.  
According to Dwyer et al. (2012, 1), the ITAR encompasses most technological 
areas that have probable military value. However, the authors delineate two main factors 
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that have affected the regulation. First, the authors cite the changing nature of the U.S. 
national security environment. Unlike during the Cold War, many factors threaten 
national security apart from the maintenance of technological parity. Second, the authors 
assert that the commercial has expanded significantly in the United States. During the 
Cold War, when the ITAR was designed, space technology was a weapon by itself and 
needed protection. Currently, space technology is capable of dual-use for military and 
commercial use. 
Some experts have pointed out at the negative consequences of ITAR and the 
discretion granted to the DDTC in determining whether items fall under the USML. 
According to Dwyer et al. (2012, 9), the regulation has affected For-Profit Stakeholders 
negatively. The authors assert that the regulation has led to the loss of the market share 
among the U.S. manufacturers. Furthermore, the study observes that the ITAR has led to 
the loss of capabilities in competitive bidding. The TAA requirements under the ITAR 
have faced criticism for making U.S. technology appear unattractive compared to the 
technology in less regulated nations. Additionally, the study contends that the regulation 
has increased the burden of compliance. According to the report, U.S. manufacturers 
spend approximately $50 million per annum in hiring export control compliance officers, 
as well as training employees about compliance. 
However, the ITAR has received significant attention domestically and on the 
international scene in the recent times. The heightened focus relates to two main factors. 
First, the threats to national and global security have increased, which has led to an 
increased need for enforcement against items with potential military use. Second, the 
industry dealing with the manufacture of such items has expanded significantly since the 
end of the Cold War. Consequently, several attempts to reform the Department of State 
concerning the authorization process, as well as the regulation itself have been conducted 
(Ordway 2009, 1). In 2010, the Department of State amended ITAR to allow the 
transference of technical data and defense articles to “third-party nationals who are bona 
fide or regular employees” (Federal Register 48625, 2010). 
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3. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
The United States enacted the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 during the rule of 
President Kennedy. The act aimed at “organizing and implementing U.S. foreign 
assistance programs with a commitment to long range economic assistance to the 
developing world” (Rennack and Chesser 2011, 1). The United States has used the act 
despite a number of amendments for almost half a decade. The Department of State 
exercises the leadership roles in overseeing the implementation of the act. The act 
encompasses several elements of the foreign assistance that the U.S. offers 
internationally. Similar to other regulations, the Foreign Assistance Act aims at 
promoting national security and foreign policy objectives of the U.S. The Act has 
significant applications in security assistance. The U.S. uses the act in providing defense 
articles and services, as well as military training in conjunction with the Arms Export 
Control Act of 1976 (Rennack and Shuey 1998, 7). 
4. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) falls under the category of military export 
controls. The act provides the president with powers and statutory authority of controlling 
the export of defense items. Essentially, the Act establishes the national and foreign 
policy goals for defense cooperation. Section 3(a) of the Act offers the general criteria of 
eligibility for international organizations and countries. Furthermore, the section 
expresses the conditions on the use of the defense items. The Act states that the United 
States will only sell defense items to friendly nations for internal security, as well as 
legitimate self-defense against aggression (Ferguson and Paul 2014): “The AECA also 
contains the statutory authority for the Foreign Military Sales program, under which the 
U.S. government sells U.S. defense equipment, services, and training on a government-
to-government basis” (5). According to Brown (2008, 2), AECA allows the United States 
to sell defense articles for internal security and legitimate self-defense. 
A key element of the AECA entails the requirement for congressional 
considerations of specific FMS suggested by the president. The procedure engrosses 
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contemplations of proposals for the sale of major defense articles and services or the 
transfer of such articles and services to other nations. The Executive Branch proceeds 
with the sale of the articles or services after ascertaining the compliance with the 
conditions and terms of the U.S. law. However, the AECA demands the notification of 
the Congress 30 days before the conclusion of the government-to-government agreements 
(Ferguson and Kerr 6). However, sales to NATO members, Australia, Japan, and New 
Zealand require only a 15-day notification. Critics suggest that the implementation of 
AECA involve political calculations that lead to differential treatment of nations, for 
example, Israel (Brown 2008, 3). 
The AECA follows the licensing policies set under the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations (ITAR). Essentially, ITAR explicates the licensing policy for exports 
of USML items. The United States requires the obtainment of a license for the export of 
all USML items. However, Canada has few restrictions since the United States considers 
it as part of its defense industrial base. Furthermore, the United States does not apply the 
AECA and the licensing requirements in Australia and the UK since it signed and ratified 
special treaties with the two countries in 2010 (Ferguson and Paul 2014, 6). Nonetheless, 
the licensing requirements under the AECA depend on the nature of the articles rather 
than the end-user or end-use. Consequently, the United States imposes unilateral 
restrictions on the export of munitions to some countries or as based on adherence to UN 
arms embargos. Notably, all firms involved in the manufacture, export, or brokering of 
USML items must register with the DDTC and pay an annual fee. 
The DDTC at the Department of State is responsible for the administration of the 
AECA. However, the Department of State has faced significant budgetary cuts over the 
years, which have affected the administration of the AECA by the DDTC negatively. 
Critics of the administration suggest that the DDTC experiences delays and has a backlog 
of unprocessed license applications (Ferguson and Paul 2014, 6). Because of the DDTC 
backlog, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-56) was enacted to require 
license applications to be processed within 60 days. (Ferguson and Kerr 2014, 6). 
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Essentially, the DDTC does not have a defined timeline for the license application 
process. 
Unlike the EAA that relies on penalties explicated in the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, the AECA has a set of enforcement penalties of its own. The 
AECA demands criminal penalties of approximately $1 million, a 20-year prison term or 
both in case of a violation. Additionally, the AECA approves civil penalties of 
approximately $500,000 followed by prohibition from future exports. Essentially, the 
enforcement of the AECA by the DDTC relies on the collaboration of the agency with 
the Defense Security Service, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement Units, as well as the Department of Homeland Security. However, 
Brown (2008, 10) asserts that diplomatic covers have allowed some buyers to use 
American weapons in ways that contravene its law. The Center for Human Rights (2013, 
9) highlights the challenges that have emerged in relation to AECA definition of defense 
articles and FAA’s definition of security assistance. Security assistance is limited to 
licenses for export of defense articles to armed forces and other internal security forces in 
foreign countries. Recent calls to transfer some articles from the USML to CCL have 
complicated the issue since this would mean that individuals located in non-eligible 
countries could acquire arms from the United States (Center for Human Rights 2013, 10). 
E. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE LIMITS 
1. Current Legislation 
The U.S. Security Assistance programs are founded on the U.S. public laws that 
provide guidance on the different appropriations and authorizations. Several programs 
require Congressional appropriations and authorizations. The programs include IMET, 
Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), peacekeeping operations (PKO) and the 
economic support fund (ESF). Additionally, the legislation addresses FMS, DCS, leases, 
and drawdowns on a reporting, oversight and reporting perspective. The Department of 
State is in charge of FMS, IMET, and FMS, but DSCA implements them (Rand and 
Tankel, 2015, 6). Two basic laws govern security assistance programs in the United 
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States: The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA). The creation of the AECA and FAA is the result of past legislation that served 
as the foundation for the current provisions (Martin, 2012 1). Notably, the FAA prohibits 
the provision of assistance authorized by AECA and FAA to foreign forces if credible 
information shows that the forces have violated human rights grossly (Sharp 2015, 26).  
The FAA (enacted in 1961) engrosses a multiplicity of provisions formerly 
contained in the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Currently, the FAA authorizes IMET, ESF, 
KPO and SA program management. Furthermore, with more than 700 sections in the 
FAA, most articles lie beyond the purview of SA program (Martin, 2012). The AECA 
was originally referred to as the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA) of 1968. Prior to 
1968, the FAA acted as the major authority for FMS. The FMSA incorporated the FMS 
programs into a separate act. The FMSA changed to AECA through the Security 
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Martin 2012, 2). Additionally, the Act 
revoked Section 414 contained in the Mutual Security Act of 1954 that provided 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) the right for commercial licensing. 
Consequently, the revocation placed the authority for DCS commercial licensing in 
AECA Section 38. “Section 38, AECA, Control of Arms Exports and Imports, which 
governs the licensing and sale of items through direct commercial channels. The AECA 
is the statutory basis for the conduct of FMS, funding for FMFP, and the control of 
commercial sales of defense articles and services” (Martin 2012, 2). 
The AECA and FAA can undergo annual and biennial amendments through SA 
authorization acts (Martin 2006, 2). Currently, the Congress rely on Department of State, 
Department of Defense, International Narcotics Control Act (INCA) and Afghanistan 
Freedom Support Act (AFSA) to enact appropriations for SA. (Martin 2006, 2) 
Consequently, The House of Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) and Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (SFRC) are accountable for authorization legislation for the security 
assistance programs (Martin 2012, 10). 
Appropriations in the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act (FOAA) are mandated for security 
assistance (Martin 2012, 1). FOAA acts as an appropriation act for a 
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multiplicity of programs including security assistance. The Continuing 
Resolution Authority (CRA) keeps the programs running in case a new 
financial year begins prior to the approval of the appropriation act. The 
CRA obligates funds against IMET, FMFP, KPO, ESF and other related 
SA programs (Martin 2012, 3).[The] FAA and AECA provide various 
conventional arms transfer authorities to the president. The post-cold war 
era decision-making criteria used by the administration for determining 
FAA and AECA-authorized arms transfers was promulgated by the White 
House on 17 February 1995 as presidential decision directive (PDD) 34, 
U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (CATP) (Defense Institute of 
Security Assistance Management 2007, 2–8 ).  
Despite its promulgation in 1995, the CATP continues being used today by the 
U.S. government for the determination of arms transfer (Martin 2012, 8). The ESF and 
FMFM are the only SA programs identified explicitly by law. The appropriated funds for 
the programs may be availed for obligation after the FY expires for which they had been 
appropriated. Transfer of FMF to FMS trust fund entail expenditure transfers. The FMF 
funds remain available ad infinitum for disbursement after their transfer (Martin 2012, 8). 
Several basic statutory provisions govern the management of SA programs. Most 
of the statutory provisions are drawn from the AECA and FAA. Section 1 of the AECA 
provides the statutory provisions the purpose of arms sales through security assistance 
programs. Consequently, the AECA authorizes the sale of defense articles to friendly 
nations to further the security objectives of the United States and in accordance with the 
UN Charter principles (Martin 2012, 8). Furthermore, Section 1 confers authority for the 
sales in the pursuit of the country’s foreign policy. The AECA and FAA delegate power 
to the president regarding the sale and transfer of arms through the security assistance 
programs (Center for Human Rights 2013, 4). Congress amended some FAA provisions 
in 2011 to align them with DOD’s Leahy Laws. The amendments reflect the increasing 
role of the DOD in security assistance. In 2014, Congress revised and extended the scope 
of DOD’s provisions (Serafino et al.2008, 4).  
 30 
2. Limits of Security Assistance 
The FAA and AECA place several limits on security assistance, especially 
concerning Foreign Military Sales. AECA Section 21(i) demands that all FMS sales that 
could compromise U.S. self-preparedness should be kept to a minimum. Additionally, the 
AECA has conventional arms restraint in which the Congress should ensure that the 
value of FMS in one financial year does not exceed the current levels. The AECA 
prohibits the performance of combatant activities. On this note, the AECA dictates that 
any personnel performing services related to defense using articles sold through FMS 
shall not engage in combat. The limit also relates “to training and advising, which could 
engage U.S. personnel in combat” (Martin 2012, 8).The FOAA places limits on the 
assistance to security forces. According to the limits, the FOAA mandates that no funding 
will be appropriated to any country suspected of violating human rights. However, 
funding can be appropriated once the secretary of defense confirms and reports to 
Congress that corrective action has been taken to eliminate the problem (Martin 2012, 9). 
The FAA also places some limits on advisory and training assistance. According 
to Section 515(b) of the FAA, advisory and training led by military personnel consigned 
to the management of security assistance oversees shall be kept minimum (Martin 10). 
Additionally, the section states that other military personnel not consigned to Section 515 
of the FAA will provide such assistance. Furthermore, the FAA places prohibitions 
related to the training of police. Section 600 of the FAA dictates that the recipient 
countries shall not use any of the funds appropriated for the provision of advice, training, 
or financial support to other law enforcement agencies such as police departments and 
prisons. However, the limit does not apply to the training and assistance offered to 
maritime law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, the limit does not apply to countries 
with a long-standing tradition of democracy or countries with no constant pattern of 
violation of human rights. The FAA and AECA further declare that only individuals with 
a personnel level authorized by the DOD shall perform civilian and military security 
assistance. 
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Unless the president finds U.S. national security interests require otherwise, the 
acts prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries that support international 
terrorism, communist states, countries in default on loans authorized by the FAA in 
excess of six months, or countries with a history of engaging in illicit drug production. 
Furthermore, the United States prohibits the provision of aid to countries that directly or 
indirectly prohibit the transportation and delivery of humanitarian assistance (Section 
6201 of FAA). Additionally, Section 110, P.L. 106–386 dictates that no security 
assistance will be offered to countries that have failed in combating human trafficking 
(Martin 2012, 12). 
Several limitations under the AECA and FAA do not have the statutory authority 
for waivers by the president. For instance, Section 6 of the AECA states that the U.S. 
government shall not provide any security assistance to countries engaged in a constant 
pattern of harassment or intimidation against U.S. citizens. Section 620(t) of the FAA 
suggests that any country that severs diplomatic relations with America shall also have 
severed the relationship for the acquisition of security assistance. Section 505(g) of the 
FAA and Section 5 of the AECA prohibits the delivery of defense articles based on 
religion, race, sex, or national origin (Martin 2012, 13). 
While the export control system safeguards the national security, the rigorous 
process involved in the State Department and Department of Defense complicates the 
process and may lead to the duplication of services. For example, Wiggenhorn observes 
that six departments at the Department of State must view the requests while five 
departments have to view the requests at the DOD. The United States has frequently 
imposed embargos on countries contravening the requirements. For example, the United 
States imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe because of its pattern of disregarding the 
rule of law and abusing human rights.  
3. The National Defense Authorization Act  
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) undergoes regular changes 
each financial year. Section 106 of the FY2010 NDAA has become a key area of interest 
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for the 113th Congress. The statute offers “authority to the Secretary of Defense to train 
and equip foreign military and maritime forces” (Serafino 2010, 1a) for two reasons. 
First, the training and equipping facilitate the performance of counterterrorism operations 
by foreign military and maritime forces. Second, foreign governments are encouraged to 
support stability where there are U.S. operations (Serafino 2010, 1a). Section 1206 has 
undergone frequent extension since its enactment as a temporary authority in 2005. The 
NDAA has been used for many years for the funding of a multiplicity of programs and 
activities including the purchase of equipment and training for the enhancement of 
maritime security capacity in foreign nations (Serafino 2010, 1a). 
Nevertheless, the decision to grant authority to the DOD under Section 1206 of 
NDAA remains controversial. Section 1206 has become the first key authority for the 
DOD used for equipping and training foreign national military forces. The statute broke 
the norm set almost 50 years ago. Some members of Congress have supported the statute 
claiming that the authority will necessitate combatant commanders to respond to threats 
instead of engaging in robust and costly military actions. Conversely, others have 
questioned the ability of the DOD in using the funds effectively and appropriately. 
Additionally, opponents claim the statute undermines the Secretary of State authority to 
ensure consistency of the U.S. foreign policy (Serafino 2008, 1a). 
The NDAA for FY2015 provides the tools and resources the military requires for 
the provision of a strong national defense. The act aims at securing the United States 
against extant and emergent threats. Consequently, the NDAA authorizes the appropriation 
of funds needed by the military to secure the nation against threats. The appropriations 
include a package of $577.1 billion aimed for national defense programs. Additionally, the 
act reduces the strategic risks caused by the sequestration through the restoration of 
$818 million in cuts for the readiness accounts in military services. The act also aims at 
enhancing the capabilities of the United States and its allies against terrorist organizations 
such as al Qaeda and ISIL. Consequently, Congress authorized $5 billion as requested by 
the president for the continuation of operations against ISIL. Additionally, the NDAA 
demands the training and equipping of Iraqi and Syrian forces (Messer 2015, 2). 
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The DOD had negligible concern for security assistance and ignored its ability to 
increase U.S. military capabilities and improve national security (Serafino 2010, 4). 
Essentially, the DOD did not consider the training of foreign military forces as a task for 
the general purpose of the U.S. military forces. Much of the training was conducted under 
the authority of the Department of State. However, the perspective toward training 
foreign militaries through security assistance programs started changing after the 9/11 
attacks. Officials in the DOD started regarding the defeat of terrorists in the countries 
where they prepare as a core issue for the U.S. national security. The DOD recognizes 
that groups who lack knowledge and cultural sensitivity fuels counterterrorism operations 
in other countries (Serafino 2008, 67). Some officials in the DOD realized the need to 
bestow the leading roles on the foreign military forces in the accomplishment of such 
objectives. The Department of Defense stated that the Department of State lacked the 
requisite capabilities and expertise for the conduction of effective counterterrorism 
operations. Additionally, the DOD stated that the processes under the traditional training 
and equipment programs were cumbersome and slow to mitigate the emerging threats 
(Serafino 2008, 2). 
As stated earlier, the DOD developed the Global Train and Equip proposal to 
cater for the shortcomings (Serafino 2010, 3a). The Department of Defense aimed at 
supporting foreign military forces to mitigate terrorism and “build the capacity of 
legitimate states to provide security within their sovereign territory to prevent terrorists in 
other countries” (Serafino 2008). The proposal required the concurrence of the 
Department of State. Concurrently, the perspective on training of foreign military forces 
through security assistance programs started evolving. “Former Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates asserted that training foreign forces is a military mission for U.S. general 
purpose forces” (Serafino 2008). The DOD requested a special emergency authority of 
Section 1206 of the NDAA FY2006, which the Congress granted. The Secretary of 
Defense stated that building partner capacity in the fight against terrorism was a vital 
military requirement. 
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Despite the dual purpose of Section 1206, almost all the funding under the section 
provided equipment and training for counterterrorism in FY2009. The equipment 
included communication systems, reconnaissance and surveillance systems, ambulances, 
trucks, ambulances, and other vehicles. Additionally, the funding provided small arms, 
aircrafts, night vision goggles and clothing. In FY2010, Section 1206 of the NDAA 
started providing funding for training and equipping military forces for stability 
operations. 
Section 1206 of the FY2015 NDAA is “funded from the DOD’s Operations and 
Maintenance (Operations and Maintenance) account” (Serafino 2014, 4). Currently, the 
limit for spending for security assistance under Section 1206 is $350 million. “The 
FY2014 NDAA states that no more than $262.5 million of FY2015 funds may be 
obligated or expended on Section 1206 programs until the Secretary of Defense, with the 
concurrence of the Secretary of State, reports on proposed planning and execution of 
programs” (Serafino 2014, 5). The Secretary of Defense has the authority to transfer or 
use defense services, articles, or training for security assistance to a foreign country 
(Serafino 2014, 22). The provision provides the Secretary of Defense with the authority 
to fund the Department of State or other federal agencies involved in security assistance 
(Serafino 2014, 23). 
F. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. The United States 
From a security framework perspective, security assistance programs aim at 
strengthening the military and security institutions of U.S. allies and partners. The core 
goals of the programs include the prevention of internal security threats, insurgency, and 
deterrence of regional adversaries, defeating terrorist networks and furthering U.S. 
foreign policy. According to Adams and Williams (2011, 27), the approach ensures 
internal security and aligns U.S. security with that if the allies and partners through the 
development of operational links with the U.S. forces. However, conventional concerns 
regarding this approach include the “ungoverned spaces” (Adams and Williams 2011, 27) 
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in which terrorists could find refuge and conduct training and preparation of attacks 
against the United States and its allies. Adams and Williams (2011, 28) assert that the 
framework has narrow and limited goals for security assistance programs. Essentially, the 
framework facilitates the development of military-to-military relationships and 
development of forces in the countries in which the United States cannot make 
deployments. Therefore, sustainable security is a secondary goal to immediate 
requirements for security assistance, which require stronger security forces. The 
perspective of the DOD on security assistance entails training, equipping, advising, and 
assisting, the defense forces of the recipient countries to increase proficiency in the 
provision of security within their borders. 
Within the security perspective, the DOD has the requisite capabilities and can 
acquire statutory flexibility. Additionally, the DOD is viewed as having the capability to 
raise funds for the implementation of the security assistance programs because it can 
effectively link the programs with its military missions and requirements. Essentially, the 
Iraq and Afghanistan security assistance programs are built on this perspective (Adams 
and Williams 2011, 28). The DOD considers that building the capability globally as one 
of its core duties. The DOD seeks an extension of its coverage beyond the military forces 
to internal security forces, border protection, and even police. 
From this perspective, the DOD is considered as “a logical lead in the structure 
and funding the security assistance portfolio” (Adams and William 2011, 28). It becomes 
the major player in conceptualizing, establishing and implementing the various programs 
as well as deeming, which countries will benefit most from those programs support 
(Adams and Williams 2011, 29). Essentially, the roles link to the core mission of creating 
partnerships with allies and partners for security purposes. The delegation of the authority 
through Section 1206 of the NDAA shows that Congress considers the department as 
having crucial contacts, flexibility, fundraising ability, and personnel for the execution of 
the programs. Additionally, the perspective shows that the foreign policy objectives of 
the country are guaranteed through the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense. 
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However, the reach and diversity of these DOD activities in shaping the 
security environment can and does often produce mixed results and reactions. At 
times in the Middle East, and earlier in Japan, the presence of American soldiers has 
inspired opposition ranging from demonstrations to bombings. On other occasions, as 
Adams and Williams, point out, foreign forces are empowered “that can operate 
effectively but are disconnected from the need to strengthen local governance” (2011, 
31). The reality, unwelcome to some, is that the military is not especially suited or 
equipped for the task of governance: 
A functioning, well-funded, and armed local security force also may create 
distortions in the path local governance and development should take. 
Sustaining that force may divert scarce local fiscal resources from other 
investments in effective administration, social, and economic 
development. Alternatively, if a balanced governance and development 
agenda is to be pursued, the creation of expensive security forces could 
lead to long-term dependence on U.S. funding. (Adams and Williams, 
2011, 29) 
With the move to confer continuing greater authority on the DOD, a gaping 
disparity could emerge between the rhetoric and reality of security assistance operations, 
as programs become narrower in focus and less effective in practice since foreign policy 
interests are governed by security considerations (Adams and Williams 2011, 30). At a 
time when American military dominance already seems evident to much of the world, it 
would be imprudent to suggest that the role of U.S. foreign policy is deteriorating. 
Similarly, the expansion of roles, funding, and missions for the DOD may lead all 
agencies and departments to conclude that DOD is operating only game in town.  Adams 
and Williams (2011, 30) lament that this would lead to an increased drifting of funds 
toward the DOD “while the capacity of the civilian institutions continues” shrinking. 
The current export controls affect security assistance significantly. The U.S. 
defense industry has consistently raised concerns regarding the benefits it can gain from 
security assistance under the current stringent controls. According to Dwyer et al. (2012, 
1), effective export control should not only limit the dissemination of technologies into 
the global marketplace, but also consider how the distortions in the control-induced 
marketplace hinder innovation in the industry. Many for-profit and non-profit space 
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communities consider the current controls as ineffective since they limit research and 
commercial activities in the industry. In essence, the manufacturers cite the complexities 
of licensing before engaging in Direct Commercial Sales and other activities within 
security assistance programs. The manufacturers are not fully encouraged by the 
licensing process because, it undermines the security assistance programs and benefits to 
the U.S. population (Dwyer et al. 2012, 6). Furthermore, other manufacturers suggest that 
the inflexibilities of the current policies undermine their capability of engaging actively 
in supporting the security assistance programs. 
2. United States Allies and Partners 
The perception of security assistance among the allies and partners differs from 
the view maintained by different departments and agencies in the United States. Despite 
the stringent requirements and regulations on the transfer and monitoring of arms, many 
countries continue seeking partnership with the United States for security assistance. 
According to Shapiro (2012, 31), the United States engaged in DCS with foreign 
countries totaling $10 billion in 2012. Additionally, the Directorate for Defense Trade 
Controls processed more than 83,000 licenses for the commercial export of defense 
articles. Foreign Military Sales accounted for $60 billion. 
As noted earlier, the DCS and FMS fall under the category of the programs 
governed in the security assistance portfolio. The increased trade between the United 
States and foreign nations illustrates that the allies and partners consider the security 
assistance programs as critical in building domestic security and defense capabilities. 
Essentially, the allies and partners consider security assistance programs as crucial 
programs for the modernization of their military capabilities. The perspective among the 
allies and partners regarding the security assistance programs relates to the preference the 
customers choose. Foreign countries or organizations may choose to use DCS or FMS 
based on several considerations. The considerations include performance, system costs, 
delivery schedule, interoperability, cycle logistics support, and industrial utilization. The 
FMS option offers countries an effective way of leveraging the extant DOD contracts 
leading to lower prices. The advantage of the security assistance programs to the foreign 
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countries is that it allows the countries to increase their military capability through a 
multiplicity of strategies. For example, a country can opt to acquire EDAs from the DLA, 
which are expected to cost lower than new equipment and systems. Therefore, the 
partners and allies consider the security assistance programs as an effective strategy for 
the participation against global insecurity. The programs have helped the allies and 
partners in building internal capabilities and professionalism for the response to threats 
and contribution toward global peace and stability. 
G. ARMS TRANSFER 
The following figures show the importance of the United States in arms transfer 
to the allies and partners. 
Figure 4.  The Imports of Major Weapon Systems, by Region 2005–2009 and 
2010–2014 Percent of Global Share 
  
 
Source: Wezeman, Pieter D., and Siemon T. Wezeman. 2014.  “Trends in International 
Arms Transfers.” Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 
http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf.  
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Figure 5.  Top 10 Arms Importers for the Period 2010–14, 
Percent Global Share 
 
 
Source: Wezeman, Pieter D., and Siemon T. Wezeman. 2014. “Trends in International 




Figure 6.  Comparison of U.S. and Other Major Suppliers’ Arms Transfer 
Agreements 
 
Source: Grimmett, Richard F, and Paul Kerr. 2012. Conventional Arms Transfers to 
Developing Nations, 2004–2011 CRS Report No. R42678. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf 
H. SUMMARY 
The chapter has offered a background of security assistance. Essentially, the 
chapter that delineated the status of the programs, the categories of security assistance, 
and the challenges facing the programs. Furthermore, it analyzed the agencies and 
regulations involved in security assistance. Additionally, the section has addressed the 
existing security assistance limits focusing on the current legislation and the National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as well as the global perspective on security 
assistance. The next section will present the findings from the secondary research 
conducted through a review of literature. 
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A.  QUALITATIVE DATA FROM LITERATURE 
The study sought the understanding of the security assistance programs in the US. 
The accumulation of data relied on a qualitative approach based on the review of the 
extant literature and documentation regarding the issue. Chapter II leads to the 
identification of some common themes that warrant in-depth analysis. The findings can 
be categorized into three categories: the need for export control reforms, the need to 
address redundancies, and the future of the security programs. 
1. Need for Reforms in Export Controls 
The information accumulated above shows the reliance on AECA, ITAR, and 
EAA as the main laws governing export controls. Furthermore, the literature has shown 
that recent events led to the delegation of authority to manage security assistance 
programs under Section 1206 of NDAA of FY2006. As discussed earlier, the current 
mechanisms for export controls have several limitations. Consequently, the limitations 
lead to the need for reforms in the control of arms. Regulations such as ITAR among 
others have been identified as major constraints toward the development of trade in the 
defense sector in the United States. Consequently, the information suggests the need for 
incorporation of new strategies that could solve the limitations. 
2. Redundancies in the Security Assistance Programs 
The literature shows explicit presence of redundancies. Essentially, the 
redundancies relate to the multiplicity of agencies and authorities involved in security 
assistance. The main departments involved in the programs are the Department of 
Defense and the Department of State. However, the two departments have not 
streamlined their objectives and goals. Essentially, the departments lack alignment of 
their strategies and systems for managing and funding the programs. Until recently, the 
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departments did not engage in collaborative strategies for the accomplishment of the 
security assistance goals. The programs also entail a multiplicity of agencies with 
redundant authorities. The two departments have agencies that perform almost similar 
duties. In other cases, the duties of the agencies in each department contradict each other. 
For example, arms transfer requires licensing from agencies in the two departments. 
However, the agencies do not collaborate in effecting the licensing processes, which 
means that one department could license a transfer under one statute while the other 
agency could fail to sign based on another statute. Essentially, the redundancies relate to 
military services (role of DOD and DOS), multiple lines of authority (different agencies 
with contradicting or similar authority) and workforce. 
3. The Future of Security Assistance 
From the policies, the future of security assistance remains a crucial part of the 
U.S. national security and foreign policy goals. However, the information shows a form 
of contradiction in the roles of the departments (DOD and DoS) after the Congress 
empowered the DOD to engage in time and expense (T&E) activities. As seen in the 
literature, the DoS had the mandate of managing the security assistance programs. 
However, the delegation of authority to the DOD under Section 1206 of the NDAA may 
undermine the role of the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the literature shows that the 
future of the security assistance programs may take a stronger security perspective while 
relegating the importance of the foreign policy perspective of the programs. The data 
depicts a yet-to-be known future of the programs based on the roles of the departments 
and agencies involved. 
B. EXPORT CONTROLS 
Currently, export controls rely on the AECA, ITAR, and EAA. The export control 
regimes control all exports regardless of whether the countries have an indigenous 
capability of producing such articles. Essentially, the acts were introduced to cater for the 
needs extant at that time. Only a few countries and companies had the capability of 
engaging in the development of such articles. Additionally, the controls maintained the 
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distinctness between the systems for military use and commercial use. However, the 
world has experienced significant changes leading to the loss of distinctiveness between 
commercial and military-use items. The BIS controls the export of dual-use items while 
the DDTC controls the transfer, export, and re-export of military-use items. 
Under the current legislation, the two departments rely on two different acts. The 
Export Administration Act (EAA) governs the BIS, which has the authority to control the 
export and re-export of virtually all commodities not subject to any other jurisdiction. 
Recently, the powers of the BIS have increased to include oversight over the export and 
re-export of some military items. This control would be better placed within the DDTC, 
which is governed by on AECA and ITAR. Consequently, the export control regimes 
lead to complexities in licensing. The two departments may take contrasting views on the 
sensitivity of an item, leading to the prolongation of the licensing process. Therefore, the 
export regimes should move from the reliance on different control lists based on different 
structures and administered by two different departments. 
The adoption of reforms would have several advantages in the export control 
processes. First, the regimes would ensure that the defense industry maintains a technical 
advantage through sheltering critical technologies from proliferation while also 
guaranteeing a competitive advantage in the international market (Martin 2012, 16). The 
reforms will also ensure the availability of new defense items and technologies and 
removal of items that no longer need control. The reforms will also help in the 
prioritization of the controls to increase flexibility in the licensing process. Lastly, the 
reforms will improve the prioritization of license applications. 
As previously stated, the implementation of export control reforms would take 
several steps. Firstly, the reforms would aim at harmonizing the different departments 
involved in exports control. Most of the tasks would involve executive or legislative 
input. After the completion of the process, the country will have a single control list, a 
single IT system, a single agency for licensing, and a single agency for enforcement 
coordination (Hansson and Lowell 2010, 1–4). 
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C. REDUNDANCIES IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
As stated earlier, among the various security assistance agencies there are a 
number of redundancies in terms of personnel, services, legislation, and authority. 
Several agencies have duplicative or overlapping authorities. As stated earlier, the DoS 
has traditionally played key roles in the implementation of security assistance programs. 
However, the DoS and DOD have started having duplicative responsibilities in the 
programs. The DOD has become the major financier of the programs despite having little 
interest in the programs during their earlier days. The involvement of the DOD in the 
programs has undermined the authority of the Department of State despite the department 
being the primary planner and designer of the programs. Both departments fund the 
projects, although the funding from the Department of State has decreased over the years. 
The involvement of two departments without a clear objective or strategy for cooperation 
has led to insufficient coordination and duplication of resources. 
Furthermore,, a multiplicity of agencies plays diverse yet overlapping roles in the 
programs. As indicated earlier, security assistance programs have a strategic relationship 
with export controls. The security assistance programs include DCS and FMS in which 
the BIS, DDTC, USASAC and other agencies may have significant roles associated with 
the licensing process. The BIS has acquired significant authority in recent days to control 
some military-use items despite of whether they are under EAA or ITAR regulation. 
However, the DDTC had a primary role in overseeing the export and re-export of 
military-use items through the power of the ITAR. Essentially, the licensing requirements 
of the ITAR differ significantly with those of the EAA. Consequently, the two 
departments may engage in redundant activities of licensing an item that could only have 
undergone licensing from only one of the agencies. The interagency strategy involved in 
the implementation of security assistance has acted as a setback for the programs because 
of ineffective coordination. The findings show the need for increased concurrency at the 
departmental level and integration of the agencies to have a single agency controlling the 
programs. 
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D. THE FUTURE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
As the threat to global security increased, the United States had to reconsider its 
strategies in security assistance. The changes occurred through the bestowment of 
authority to the DOD to fund and control the programs. Meanwhile, the role of the United 
States in security assistance through arms transfers has increased as depicted in the 
previously shown figures. However, the change toward the DOD being the controller of 
the programs has led to the lack of an effective oversight mechanism for the evaluation of 
the programs. The DOD has the capability to control and raise funds for the programs. 
However, the programs have a key role in the country’s foreign policy objectives. As 
observed earlier, the DOD has a security perspective in designing and implementing the 
programs. Traditionally, the DOD has not had significant involvement in issues related to 
foreign policy. Consequently, the future of the programs may shift toward non-traditional 
activities since the DOD emphasizes on military training and equipping.  
As indicated earlier, the United States has not reviewed the performance of the 
programs for several decades. Consequently, this could mean that the departments may 
not have met the objectives of the programs. The future of the programs depends on the 
implementation of an effective framework that considers both security and foreign policy 
goals. Additionally, the future depends on the effective structuring of the relationship 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Security assistance programs play a crucial part in furthering the foreign policy 
objectives of the United States in addition to ensuring global peace and security. The 
issue of security assistance has a strategic relationship with export controls in which 
different departments and agencies play key roles. Essentially, the Department of 
Defense, Department of State, and Department of Commerce have crucial roles in the 
programs. The agencies mentioned will also be instrumental in the transformation and 
implementation to reform export controls and security assistance. However, the analysis 
shows that the current regimes in export controls have a detrimental effect on security 
assistance programs. Essentially, the regimes have limited the competitiveness of the 
defense industry. Furthermore, the reliance on multiple agencies for licensing increases 
the time required for licensing, which portrays the inefficiencies of the agencies. 
Consequently, it is essential for the departments and agencies to consider the adoption of 
reforms. As stated earlier, the agencies and departments should focus on aligning their 
objectives and strategies for the achievement of the national security and foreign policy 
goals. 
The regulations used in export controls and security assistance were drafted long 
ago. However, changes have occurred that require reforms in the acts. More importantly, 
the reliance on multiple agencies is associated with redundancies. The redundancies 
imply weak governance in which the institutions are not integrated or do not share 
information sufficiently. While security assistance was traditionally a duty of the 
Department of State, the roles of the Department of Defense have increased in recent 
years. Consequently, this has blurred the boundary in the authority of each of the 
departments in managing security assistance programs. Additionally, the classification of 
items in the Commerce Control List has faced challenges as BIS and other agencies try to 
control the export of such items. Essentially, the multiple lines of authority have led to 
 48 
challenges in the governance of export controls and security assistance programs. 
Fundamentally, the future of security assistance programs will rely on the roles taken by 
the State Department and the Department of Defense, as well as the associated agencies. 
From the literature, it can be inferred that the future is likely to take a military perspective 
based on the increasing role of the DOD in managing the programs. However, the future 
could increase “conflicts” between agencies unless effective reforms are adopted.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As suggested earlier, the current security framework adopted by the Department 
of Defense in security assistance may fail to address the foreign policy and security 
objectives. Consequently, the study recommends the adoption of a governance 
framework for implementing the security assistance programs. The framework would 
help in the creation of accountable, transparent, and honest forces (institutions) while 
maintaining the core focus on security. The governance perspective could help the United 
States in aligning its response to critical security scenarios in recipient countries without 
having to deploy its personnel. The reinforcement of the military capability of the 
recipient nations may have short-term outcomes, but may be counter-productive in the 
end. Therefore, the implementation of the security assistance programs should also focus 
on institutional leadership among the military personnel, especially in relation to 
programs such as IMET. Therefore, the following suggestions could help in the adoption 
of this recommendation: 
• Reinforcement of civilian leadership in the SA programs 
• DOD to maintain its role in the implementation of T&E programs 
• Tasking and empowering the Department of State in implementing 
security assistance programs through increased funding 
• Realigning the accounts and funding for security assistance program 
• Consolidating the authorities responsible for all aspects related to security 
assistance. 
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